UC-NRLF 


GIFT   OF 


< ^ . *f*t*-  f  0 

STATEMENT 


OF 


A  PROPER  MILITARY  POLICY 


FOR  THE 


UNITED  STATES 


PREPARED  BY  THE  WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION,  GENERAL  STAFF  'cOrfPS 

IN  COMPLIANCE  WITH  INSTRUCTIONS  OF  THE  pECRETARY  OF  WAR 

MARCH,  1915 

W.  C.  D.  9053-90 


ARMY  WAR  COLLEGE 

SEPTEMBER 

1915 


WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT  PRINTING  OFFICE 
1916 


Al 


#, 


WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
OFFICE  OF  THE  CHIEF  OF  STAFF, 

WAR  COLLEGE  DIVISION, 
Washington,  September  11,  1915. 
Memorandum  for  the  Chief  of  Staff: 
Subject:  Military  policy. 

1.  Memorandums  from  your  office,  dated  March  11  and  March  17, 
1915,  directed  the  War  College  Division  to  make  a  complete  and  ex- 
haustive study  of  a  proper  military  policy  for  the  U.QKed  States,  aiid^ 
to  prepare  a  clearly  and  succinctly  expressed  statement  of  the  policy, 
basing  it,  in  a  general  way,  upon  the  "  Keport  on  tfie  Organization  o?> 
the  Land  Forces  of  the  United  States,  1912,"  "eliminating  every- 
thing that  is  not  necessary  for  the  easy  and  quick  comprehension  of 
the  military  policy,  and  adding  anything  which  may  be  necessary  to 
afford  such  comprehension." 

2.  The  following  extract  from  the  memorandum  of  March  17, 1915, 
gives  the  subjects  which  the  "  statement "  was  to  cover,  viz : 

The  substance  of  this  policy  will,  therefore,  be  a  clearly  and  succinctly  ex- 
pressed statement,  with  the  reasons  therefor,  of  the  recommended  strength  and 
organization  of- — 

I.  (a)   The  Regular  Army; 
(&)  The  Organized  Militia. 

This  should  be  followed  by — 

II.  A  careful  study  of  the  question  of  a  reserve  for  both  the  Regular  Army 
and  the  Organized  Militia  and,  if  possible  to  agree  upon  it,  a  plan  for  the  forma- 
tion of  such  reserves. 

III.  The  Volunteers:  Their  organization  and  relation  to  the  Regular  Army 
and  the  Organized  Militia. 

IV.  Reserve  material  and  supplies  which  should  be  available  and  which  can 
not  be  promptly  obtained  if  delayed  till  the  outbreak  of  war. 

The  Secretary  of  War  is  of  the  opinion  that  a  statement  which  shall  contain 
everything  that  is  pertinent  to  the  foregoing  subjects  will  inform  Congress  of 
all  the  essential  things  that  the  best  judgment  of  the  War  Department  thinks  it 
is  justified  in  asking  Congress  to  provide  in  peace  and  to  be  prepared  to  provide 
in  war.  These  things,  being  such  as  commend  themselves  to  the  general  mili- 
tary intelligence  (if  they  do  not  so  commend  themselves  there  can  be  no  policy 
such  as  is  now  aimed  at),  may  be  assumed  to  be  those  that  will  be  asked  for  by 
succeeding  administrations  of  the  War  Department — at  least,  they  will  indicate 
the  general  line  of  development  to  be  pursued.  Such  a  statement  will  constitute 
what  he  has  in  mind  as  a  comprehensive  military  policy. 

There  are  many  other  things  that  will  from  time  to  time  be  asked  of  Congress 
or,  when  authority  exists  for  it,  that  will  be  done  without  asking  legislation. 
Such  things  may  be  requests  for  appropriations  to  build  new  posts  in  view  of 
the  abandoning  of  others ;  the  concentration  of  the  Army  in  a  smaller  number 
of  posts  in  definite  areas  of  the  country  ;  projects  for  promotion,  retirement,  etc. ; 
plans  for  training  the  Army  and  the  militia,  etc. 

Such  things  have  no  part  in  the  statement  of  a  general  military  policy  which 
the  Secretary  of  War  now  desires  to  have  prepared,  and  in  order  to  save  time 

m 

6673-J7 


IV  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

and  labor  and  to  concentrate  attention  upon  that  which  is  essential,  he  desires 
any  such  extraneous  matter  to  be  eliminated  from  the  study  which  he  has 
directed. 

3.  Following  these  lines  the  accompanying  "  Statement  of  a  Proper 
Military  Policy  for  the  United  States  "  was  prepared. 

4.  It  is  proposed  to  supplement  this  statement  later  with  brochures 
on  such  subjects  as  require  more  detailed  discussion  than  would  be 
appropriate  herein. 

M.  M.  MACOMB, 
Brigadier  General,  Chief  of  War  College  Division. 


CONTENTS. 


Page. 

MEMORANDUM  FOR  THE  CHIEF  OF  STAFF in 

INTRODUCTION , .  1 

THE  MILITARY  PROBLEM  CONFRONTING  THE  UNITED  STATES 1 

The  evolution  of  national  military  policies 1 

Our  abiding  national  policies 2 

Coordinate  relationship  of  Army  and  Navy 2 

Coordinate  relationship  of  statesman  and  soldier 3 

Preparedness  of  the  world  powers  for  oversea  expeditions 3 

Statement  of  the  military  problem 5 

I.  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 5 

GENERAL  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY 5 

MOBILE  AND  COAST  ARTILLERY  TROOPS  AND  THEIR  FUNCTIONS...  6 

RELATION  BETWEEN  HOME  AND,  OVERSEA  GARRISONS 7 

GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  OF  OVERSEA  SERVICE 7 

The  Philippines. 7 

Oahu,  Hawaiian  Islands 8 

The  Panama  Canal 8 

Guantariamo 9 

Alaska 9 

Porto  Rico 9 

GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  OF  HOME  SERVICE 9 

General  distribution  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  fortified  areas. . .  9 

General  distribution  of  mobile  troops  in  strategic  areas 9 

Puget  Sound  area 10 

California  area '. 10 

Atlantic  area 10 

Middle  West  area 11 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  MOBILE  TROOPS  FOR  OVERSEA  SERVICE.  11 

The  Philippines 11 

Oahu 11 

Panama 11 

Guantanamo 11 

Alaska 12 

Porto  Rico 12 

Tabular  statement 12 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  MOBILE  TROOPS  FOR  HOME  SERVICE 12 

Tabular  statement  showing  distribution  of  administrative  units 

of  mobile  troops  m  strategic  areas 12 

Formation  of  higher  tactical  units  and  their  distribution  in  stra- 
tegic areas 13 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  COAST  ARTILLERY  TROOPS  REQUIRED  FOR 

SERVICE  OVERSEAS  AND  AT  HOME 13 

TOTAL  STRENGTH  OF  THE   REGULAR  TROOPS   REQUIRED  FOR  ALL 

SERVICES 13 

Organization 14 

II.  THE  ORGANIZED  MILITIA 15 

Constitutional  functions 15 

Some  uses  a?  a  Federal  force 15 

Limitations 15 

Recommendations 16 

III.   RESERVES 16 

The  Regular  Reserve 16 

Citizen  soldiers 17 

Reserve  officers 17 

IV.  THE  VOLUNTEERS 17 

V.  RESERVE  MATERIEL  AND  SUPPLIES 18 

List  of  Brochures .  .  22 


A  PROPER  MILITARY  POLICY  FOR  THE  UNITED 

STATES. 


INTRODUCTION.  ./,    ;      -     -      >  V  i^  i  ,J 

THE  MILITARY  PROBLEM  CONFRONTING  THE  UNITED  STATES. 

1.  The  evolution  of  national  military  policies. — National  policies 
are  evolved  and  are  expanded  as  the  Nation  grows.  They  reflect  the 
national  sense  of  responsibility  and  also  the  national  ambitions. 
They  constitute  the  doctrine  underlying  acts  of  statesmanship  and 
diplomacy.  A  nation's  military  policy  is  the  national  doctrine  of 
self-preservation.  The  world  is  never  without  virile,  capable,  and 
progressive  nations,  the  circumstances  of  whose  development  have 
imbued  them  with  the  belief  that  their  vital  interests  demand  an 
active  aggressive  policy.  They  are  forced  to  resort  to  universal 
service  in  the  effort  to  fulfill,  at  any  cost,  what  they  conceive  to  be 
their  destiny.  In  the  United  States  the  development  of  the  Nation 
has  proceeded  under  an  environment  so  favorable  that  there  is  no 
well-defined  public  opinion  in  regard  to  what  constitutes  an  ade- 
quate military  policy.  Heretofore  isolation,  combined  with  the  neces- 
sity of  preserving  the  balance  of  power,  has  been  a  sufficient  guaranty 
against  strong  hostile  expeditions  from  Europe  or  Asia.  The  safe- 
guard of  isolation  no  longer  exists.  The  oceans,  once  barriers,  are 
now  easy  avenues  of  approach  by  reason  of  the  number,  speed,  and 
carrying  capacity  of  ocean-going  vessels.  The  increasing  radii  of 
action  of  the  submarine,  the  aeroplane,  and  wireless  telegraphy  all 
supplement  ocean  transport  in  placing  both  our  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
coasts  within  the  sphere  of  hostile  activities  of  oversea  nations. 

The  great  mass  of  the  public  does  not  yet  realize  the  effect  of  these 
changed  conditions  upon  pur  scheme  of  defense. 

Another  thing  that  militates  against  the  evolution  of  a  sound 
military  policy  for  our  country  is  the  erroneous  conclusion  drawn  by 
the  people  from  our  past  experiences  in  war.  In  developing  such  a 
policy  victory  is  often  a  less  trustworthy  guide  than  defeat.  We 
have  been  plunged  into  many  wars  and  have  ultimately  emerged 
successfully  from  each  of  them.  The  general  public  points  to  these 
experiences  as  an  indication  that  our  military  policy  has  been  and 
still  continues  to  be  sound.  That  this  is  not  really  the  belief  of  those 
in  authority  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  each  war  of  importance  has 
been  followed  by  an  official  investigation  of  our  military  system  and 
the  policy  under  which  it  operated.  The  reports  of  these  investiga- 
tions give  a  startling  picture  of  faulty  leadership,  needless  waste  of 
lives  and  property,  costly  overhead  charges  augumented  by  payment 


2  A    PBOPEB    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

of  bounties  to  keep  up  voluntary  enlistments,  undue  prolongations  of 
all  these  wars,  and  finally  reckless  expenditure  of  public  funds  for 
continuing  pensions.  These  documents  supply  convincing  proofs 
that  all  such  shortcomings  have  been  due  entirely  to  a  lack  of  ade- 
quate preparation  for  war  in  time  of  peace.  But  we  have  not  yet 
learned  our  lesson.  It  has  never  been  driven  home  by  the  bitterness 
of  defeat.  TVe  have  never  known  a  Jena  or  a  Sedan.  At  no  stage 
of  our  national  life  have  we  been  brought  face  to  face  with  the  armed 
strength  of  a  great  world  power  free  to  land  sufficient  forces  to  gain 
a  foothold  at  any,  desired  portion  of  our  coasts.  That  we  have  to 
-seiite  extVTittfeii;tliis  danger  is  evidenced  by  our  efforts  to  provide  a 
naVy  as' a1  first  Tine  of,  defense  and  to  supplement  it  with  the  necessary 
:harbar;!rpttfficatipns;:but  we  have  not  yet  realized  that^our  ultimate 
^safeguard  4s4 till  "adequate  and  well-organized  mobile*  land  force. 
Experience  in  war  has  shown  the  need  of  these  three  elements  but 
the  public  has  not  yet  demanded  that  they  be  perfected,  coordinated, 
and  combined  in  one  harmonious  system  of  national  defence.  Not 
until  this  has  been  accomplished  will  a  proper  military  policy  for  the 
United  States  be  adopted. 

2.  Our  abiding  national  policies. — The  majority  of  our  people  have 
always  believed  in  asserting  their  own  rights  and  in  respecting  those 
of  others.    They  desire  that  the  cause  of  right  should  prevail  and  that 
lawlessness  should  be  crushed  out.     To  live  up  to  these  high  ideals 
imposes  upon  us  new  duties  as  a  world  power;  duties  that  require 
something  more  positive  than  a  policy  of  mere  passive  defense.     In 
addition,  there  are  two  underlying  and  abiding  national  policies 
whose  maintenance  we  must  consider  as  necessary  to  our  national  life. 
These  are  the  "  Monroe  doctrine  "  and  the  policy  of  avoiding  "  entan- 
gling alliances."     They  are  distinctive  and  affect  our  international 
relations  in  a  definite  manner.    In  addition,  policies  may  develop  in 
the  future  as  a  result  of  international  relations  with  respect  to  trade 
conditions. 

A  general  consideration  of  our  responsibilities  as  a  nation  and  of 
our  geographical  position  indicates  that  the  maintenance  of  our 
abiding  policies  and  interests  at  home  and  abroad  involves  problems 
of  defense  measures  both  on  land  and  on  sea.  The  solution  of  the 
general  problem  of  national  defense  must  be  sought  in  the  provision 
of  adequate  land  and  sea  forces  and  a  consideration  of  their  co- 
ordinate relationship. 

3.  Coordinate  relationship  of  Army  and  Nary. — Upon  the  Navy 
devolves  the  solution  of  the  problem  of  securing  and  maintaining 
control  of  the  sea.     To  accomplish  this  it  must  be  free  to  take  the 
offensive  promptly — that  is.  to  seek  out  and  defeat  the  enemy  fleet. 
The  use  of  any  part  of  the  high-sea  fleet  for  local  defense  defeats  the 
chief  object  of  the  Xavy  and  is  a  misuse  of  naval  power.    A  fleet  de- 
feated at  sea  and  undefended  by  an  adequate  army  is  powerless 
either  to  prevent  invasion  or  even  its  own  ultimate  destruction  by 
combined  hostile  land  and  naval  forces.    In  illustration  compare  the 
cases  of  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Santiago  and  the  Russian  fleet  at  Port 
Arthur  with  the  present  example  of  the  German.   Austrian,   and 
Turkish  fleets  under  the  protection  of  land  forces. 

Upon  the  Army  devolves  the  task  of  gaining  and  maintaining  on 
shore  the  ascendency  over  hostile  land  and  naval  operations.  To 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  3 

accomplish  this  it  must  be  able  to  seek  out  promptly  and  to  defeat, 
capture,  or  destroy  the  invader  wherever  he  may  attempt  either  to 
secure  a  footing  upon  our  territory  or  to  enter  the  waters  of  our  har- 
bors with  the  object  of  threatening  the  destruction  of  the  seaport 
or  of  a  fleet  driven  to  seek  refuge  or  repair  therein. 

The  problems  involved  in  operations  against  hostile  land  forces 
are  complex  and  include  only  as  an  incident  the  protection  of  harbor 
defenses  on  the  land  side.  The  problems  of  harbor  defense  against 
attack  from  the  sea  are  simple  and  passive  in  their  nature. 

4.  Coordinate  relationship  of  statesman  and  soldier. — In  our  coun- 
try  public   opinion  estimates  the   situation,   statecraft   shapes  the 
policy,  while  the  duty  of  executing  it  devolves  upon  the  military 
and  naval  departments. 

Such  a  doctrine  is  sound  in  direct  proportion  to  its  success  in  pro- 
ducing a  military  system  capable  of  developing  fighting  power  suffi- 
cient to  meet  any  given  national  emergency,  at  the  proper  time,  sup- 
ported by  all  the  resources,  technical  and  economic,  of  the  country, 
in  a  word — preparedness.  All  the  other  world  powers  of  to-day  have 
realized  the  necessity  of  maintaining  highly  trained  and  organized 
military  and  naval  forces  in  time  of  peace,  and  all,  or  nearly  all,  are 
allied  in  powerful  coalitions. 

Without  superiority  on  the  sea  or  an  adequate  land  force  there  is 
nothing  to  prevent  any  hostile  power  or  coalition  of  powers  from 
landing  on  our  shores  such  part  of  its  trained  and  disciplined  troops 
as  its  available  transports  can  carry.  The  time  required  is  limited 
only  by  the  average  speed  of  its  vessels  and  the  delay  necessarily 
consumed  in  embarking  and  disembarking. 

In  order  that  the  American  people  can  intelligently  decide  on  a 
doctrine  of  preparedness  which  shall  constitute  the  military  policy 
of  the  United  States,  and  that  Congress  and  the  Executive  may  be 
able  to  carry  out  their  decision,  information  concerning  the  military 
strength  of  other  great  nations  and  shipping  available  for  transport 
purposes  must  be  clearly  set  forth. 

The  work  of  the  statesman  and  of  the  soldier  and  sailor  are  there- 
fore coordinate;  where  the  first  leaves  off  the  others  take  hold. 

5.  Preparedness  of  the  world  powers  for  oversea  expeditions. — 
Control  of  the  sea  having  been  once  gained  by  our  adversary  or 
adversaries,  there  is  nothing  to  prevent  them  from  dispatching  an 
oversea  expedition  against  us.     In  order  to  form  an  idea  of  the 
mobile  force  we  should  have  ready  to  resist  it  an  estimate  must  first 
be  made  of  the  approximate  number  of  troops  that  other  nations 
might  reasonably  be  expected  to  transport  and  of  the  time  required 
to  land  them  on  our  coasts. 

The  number  of  thoroughly  trained  and  organized  troops  an  enemy 
can  bring  in  the  first  and  succeeding  expeditions  under  such  an 
assumption  is  a  function  of— 

(a)  The  size  of  the  enemy's  army,  and 

( ~b )  The  number,  size,  and  speed  of  the  vessels  of  the  enemy's  mer- 
chant marine  that  can  be  used  as  transports. 

Should  our  enemy  be  a  nation  in  arms — that  is,  one  in  which  all  or 
nearly  all  of  the  male  inhabitants  of  suitable  physique  are  given  a 
minimum  of  two  years'  training  with  the  colors  in  time  of  peace  (and 
this  is  true  of  all  world  powers  except  ourselves  and  England),  it  is 

36085—16 2 


4  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

evident  that  the  size  of  the  first  expedition  and  succeeding  expeditions 
would  be  limited  only  by  the  number  of  vessels  in  the  transport  fleets. 
It  also  follows  that  as  the  capacity  and  number  of  steamers  in  the 
merchant  marine  of  any  nation  or  group  of  nations  increase  in  the 
future,  the  number  of  trained  soldiers  which  such  nation  could  send 
in  such  expedition  will  also  increase,  and  our  trained  forces  should 
be  correspondingly  augmented. 

What  the  conditions  were  in  August,  1914,  is  shown  in  the  follow- 
ing table,  which  may  be  regarded  as  a  reasonable  estimate: 

Preparedness  of  the  great  powers  for  over-sea  expeditions. 


Nation. 

Strength 
of  army. 

3  Tonnage  available  of  ships 
with  capacity  over— 

First  expe- 
dition using 
50  per  cent 
of  tonnage 
given. 

Second  expe- 
dition using 
75  per  cent 
of  tonnage 
given. 

Time 
needed  to  — 

Load 
and 
cross 
ocean 
with 
first 
expe- 
di- 
tion. 

Re- 
turn, 
load, 
and 
re- 
cross 
with 
sec- 
ond 

T- 

tion. 

!  ' 

3,000          2,000 
tons,     i    tons. 

1,000 
tons. 

Men. 

An- 
imals. 

Men. 

An- 
imals. 

Austria-Hungary  .  . 
France 

4,320,000 
5,000,000 
5,000,000 
1695.000 
2,600,000 
2,212,000 
5,000,000 

762,756 
1,705,931 
3,569,9624,018,185 
13,  000,  000i 

72,000 
160,931 
4  387,000 
170,000 
91,000 
95,  745 
37,  630 

14,000 
32,  186 
«  81,  270 
90,000 
13,  650 
24,  416 
7,940 

108,000 
243,295 
«  440,000 

21,600 
48,279 
^94,600 

Days. 
20.7 
15.8 
15.8 
14.0 
18.3 
22.5 
20.5 

Days. 
40.4 
30.0 
30.8 
27.0 
35.0 
41.0 
40.0 

Germany 

Great  Britain  
Italy  

1,065,321 

136,000 
142,622 
66,  444 

20,475 
36,623 
11,918 

21,013,985 

Russia 

428  019 

I 

i  240,500  territorials. 

*  Japanese  field  regulations  indicate  the  intention  to  use  steamers  of  1 ,000  tons;  for  this  reason  and  because 
of  the  large  amount  of  steamers  between  10  and  12  knots  speed,  all  Japanese  steamers  over  10  knots  speed 
and  a  thousand  tons  gross  have  been  considered. 

s  Fifty  per  cent  has  been  assumed  as  the  figure  representing  the  amount  of  shipping  in  or  within  call  of 
home  ports  at  outbreak  of  war. 

«  Using  no  ships  less  than  3,000  tons. 

NOTE.— The  allowance  prescribed  in  our  Field  Service  Regulations  of  3  tons  per  man  and  8  tons  per 
animal  for  ships  over  5,000  tons  and  4  tons  per  man  and  10  tons  per  animal  for  vessels  under  5,000  tons  has 
been  used  in  estimating  the  capacity  of  ships,  except  where  the  regulations  of  any  country  prescribe  a 
different  allowance.  These  allowances  include  rations,  water,  forage,  etc.,  for  the  voyage  and  a  margin 
(or  three  months'  reserve  supplies.  The  tonnage  allowance  covers  men,  animals,  and"  all  accessories  and 
is  sufficient  to  provide  for  vehicles  (including  guns). 

Fighting  power  is  the  result  of  organization,  training,  and  equipment  backed  by  the  resources  of  the 
country.  Available  shipping  is  a  matter  of  commercial  statistics. 

The  quality,  organization,  and  efficiency  of  these  troops,  except 
those  of  Japan,  which  demonstrated  their  excellence  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  are  now  undergoing  a  supreme  test  of  military 
strength  on  land  and  sea.  This  test  by  the  ordeal  of  battle  is  visibly 
demonstrating  their  organization,  their  fighting  power,  and  the  rate 
at  which  each  is  capable  of  developing  and  maintaining  its  military 
strength.  In  addition,  where  certain  nations  have  transported  troops 
by  sea  their  capabilities  in  this  respect  have  to  some  extent  been 
shown. 

This  evidence,  produced  under  conditions  of  actual  warfare,  pre- 
sents an  example  of  the  resultant  efficiency  of  any  nation  that  has  de- 
veloped a  sound  military  policy ;  the  soundest  policy  being  the  one 
which  insures  a  successful  termination  of  the  war  in  the  shortest  time. 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  5 

6.  Statement  of  the  military  problem. — From  what  has  been  stated, 
we  are  forced  to  the  conclusion  that  we  must  be  prepared  to  resist  a 
combined  land  and  sea  operation  of  formidable  strength.    Our  prin- 
cipal coast  cities  and  important  harbors  have  already  been  protected 
by  harbor  defenses  which,  by  passive  method  alone,  can  deny  to  an 
enemy  the  use  of  these  localities  as.  bases  for  such  expeditions. 

The  enemy  being  unable  to  gain  a  foothold  in  any  of  these  fortified 
areas  by  direct  naval  attack  will  therefore  be  forced  to  find  some  suit- 
able place  on  the  coast  from  which  land  operations  can  be  conducted 
both  against  the  important  coast  cities  and  the  rich  commercial  cen- 
ters in  the  interior.  Long  stretches  of  coast  line  between  the  fortified 
places  lie  open  to  the  enemy.  The  only  reasonable  way  in  which  these 
localities  can  be  defended  is  by  providing  a  mobile  land  force  of  suffi- 
cient strength,  so  located  that  it  may  be  thrown  in  at  threatened 
points  at  the  proper  time. 

It  has  just  been  shown  what  the  strength  of  these  expeditions  might 
be,  as  well  as  the  time  required  for  any  one  of  them  to  develop  its 
whole  effective  force.  Hence  it  can  be  seen,  when  we  take  into  con- 
sideration the  possible  two  months'  delay  provided  by  the  Navy,  that 
our  system  should  be  able  to  furnish  500,000  trained  and  organized 
mobile  troops  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  and  to  have  at  least  500,000 
more  available  within  90  days  thereafter.  Here,  however,  it  must  be 
pointed  out  that  two  expeditions  alone  will  provide  a  force  large 
enough  to  cope  with  our  1,000,000  mobile  troops,  and  consequently  we 
must  at  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  provide  the  system  to  raise  and 
train,  in  addition,  at  least  500,000  troops  to  replace  the  losses  and 
wastage  in  personnel  incident  to  war.  To  provide  this  organized  land 
force  is  the  military  problem  before  us  for  solution. 

I.   THE  BEGULAB  ARMY. 
GENERAL  FUNCTIONS  OF  THE  REGULAR  ARMY. 

7.  In  the  endeavor  to  reach  a  just  conclusion  as  to  the  strength 
and  organization  of  a  Kegular  Army,  adequate  to  play  its  part  in 
our  national  defense,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  defense  is  a 
joint  problem  requiring  for  its  correct  solution  the  united  efforts  of 
both  Army  and  Navy,  and  that  the  ultimate  strength  of  the  greater 
war  army  is  dependent  to  a  considerable  extent  upon  the  part  to  be 
played  by  the  fleet.     It  is  therefore  assumed  in  this  discussion  that 
the  Navy  is  preparing  to  place  and  maintain  in  the  Pacific,  when  the 
occasion  requires,  a  force  superior  to  that  of  any  oriental  nation,  and, 
in  the  Atlantic,  one  second  only  to  that  of  the  greatest  European 
naval  power. 

The  Regular  Army  is  the  peace  nucleus  of  the  greater  war  army  of 
the  Nation.  Its  strength  and  organization  should  be  determined  not 
only  by  its  relation  to  the  larger  force  but  by  its  own  peace  and  war 
functions.  It  must  be  prepared  at  all  times  to  meet  sudden  and 
special  emergencies,  which  can  not  be  met  by  the  army  of  citizen 
soldiers.  Its  units  must  be  the  models  for  the  organization  and  train- 
ing of  those  of  the  great  war  army. 

Some  of  the  functions  of  the  Regular  Army  are : 

(a)  To  furnish  the  entire  strength  of  our  garrisons  outside  of  the 
United  States  proper  both  in  peace  and  war. 


6  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

(b)  To  garrison  our  harbor  defenses  within  the  United  States 
proper  in  time  of  peace. 

(<?)  To  furnish  detachments  of  mobile  forces  in  time  of  peace  suffi- 
cent  for  the  protection  of  these  harbor  defenses  and  naval  bases 
against  naval  raids  which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  precede  a 
declaration  of  war. 

(d)  To  furnish  sufficient  mobile  forces  to  protect  our  principal 
cities  by  preventing  the  landing  of  hostile  expeditions  for  their  cap- 
ture in  the  intervals  between  our  fortified  harbors  or  near  such  cities. 

(e)  To  supply  a  mobile  reserve  to  reenforce  our  garrisons  outside 
of  the   United   States  proper  during  periods   of   insurrection   and 
disorder. 

(/)  To  furnish  expeditionary  forces  for  minor  wars  resulting  from 
the  occupation  of  foreign  territory  where  treaty  rights  or  funda- 
mental national  policies  may  have  been  threatened. 

(g)  To  prepare  ill  advance  its  existing  administrative  and  supply 
departments  for  the  equipment,  transportation,  and  supply  of  the 
great  wrar  army  of  the  Nation. 

(A)  To  assist  in  the  training  of  organizations  of  citizen  soldiers. 

8.  Concerning  the  strength  and  organization  of  the  Regular  Army, 
the  following  points  are  to  be  considered : 

(a)  At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  Regular  Army  at  home  should  be 
strong  enough,  with  the  addition  of  organized  and  trained  citizen 
soldiers,  to  form  the  first  line  of  defense  in  order  to  give  sufficient 
time  to  permit  the  mobilization  and  concentration  of  our  greater  war 
army,  and  to  seize  opportunities  for  such  immediate  initial  operations 
as  may  be  undertaken  before  the  mobilization  of  the  army  of  citizen 
soldiers  can  be  completed. 

(b)  It  should  be  so  organized  and  located  that  it  can  be  economi- 
cally and  efficiently  trained,  quickly  and  easily  mobilized  and  concen- 
trated, and  readily  used  as  a  model  in  the  education  and  training  of 
the  citizen  forces. 

MOBILE    AND    COAST   ARTILLERY   TROOPS    AND    THEIR    FUNCTIONS. 

9.  Experience  has  shown  that  our  regular  land  forces  and  others 
modeled  upon  them  must  consist  of  two  distinct  classes,  i.  e. : 

(a)  Mobile  troops. 

(b)  Coast  Artillery  troops. 

These  two  groups  have  their  own  special  functions  for  which  they 
are  trained  and  equipped  and  from  which  they  should  not  be  diverted 
except  in  some  emergency. 

The  function  of  the  Coast  Artillery  is  to  man  our  harbor  defenses 
designed  to  protect  important  seaports  from  direct  naval  attacks  and 
raids  from  the  sea.  The  armament  and  accessories  of  these  forts  are 
intended  to  be  so  complete  and  powerful  as  not  only  to  prevent 
hostile  landings  at  all  places  within  range  of  the  guns,  but  also  to 
cover  all  navigable  waters  in  the  vicinity  of  great  seacoast  cities  so 
thoroughly  as  to  leave  no  dead  spaces  from  which  enemy  ships,  either 
at  anchor  or  during  a  run-by,  could  bring  them  under  bombardment. 
While  these  harbor  forts  are  important  elements  in  our  scheme  of 
defense,  they  are.  nevertheless,  powerless  to  prevent  invasion  at 
points  outside  the  range  of  their  guns.  The  total  length  of  our  coast 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  7 

line  is  enormous,  and  the  stretches  covered  by  harbor  defenses  are 
and  must  remain  very  small  compared  with  the  unprotected  inter- 
vals that  lie  between  them.  If  we  should  lose  command  of  the  sea 
an  invader  would  simply  land  in  one  of  these  intervals.  It  there- 
fore follows  that  the  ultimate  defense  of  our  coasts  depends  upon 
defeating  a  mobile  army  of  invasion,  and  this  can  be  done  only  by 
having  mobile  forces  prepared  to  operate  in  any  possible  theater  of 
war.  At  this  stage  of  hostilities  the  problem  becomes  one  of  cooper- 
ation between  Coast  Artillery  and  mobile  troops,  but  there  can  be  no 
fixed  relation  in  the  strength  of  these  two  classes  of  land  forces. 
The  necessary  strength  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  depends  upon  the 
number  and  character  of  harbor  defenses  established ;  that  of  mobile 
troops  upon  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  defensive  and  offensive 
operations  for  which  the  Nation  decides  to  be  prepared. 

RELATION   BETWEEN    HOME   AND   OVERSEA    GARRISONS. 

10.  The  most  rational  method  of  determining  the  proper  strength 
and  organization  of  the  Regular  Army  is  based  upon  the  fact  that 
this  force  is  and  must  be  divided  into  two  distinct  parts — one  for 
oversea  service,  the  other  for  home  service.     Each  of  these  parts 
must  have  its  proper  quota,  both  of  mobile  and  Coast  Artillery 
troops. 

The  troops  on  oversea  service  consist  of  the  detachments  required 
to  meet  the  special  military  problems  of  the  Philippines,  Oahu, 
Panama,  Alaska,  Guantanamo,  and  Porto  Rico.  Each  of  these  de- 
tachments has  a  distinct  tactical  and  strategic  mission,  and  is  to 
operate  wdthin  a  restricted  terrain.  All  of  them  are  limited  to  over- 
sea communication  with  the  home  country,  and  all  of  them  may 
therefore  be  isolated  for  considerable  periods,  especially  in  the  criti- 
cal first  stages  of  war.  It  is  obvious  that  under  these  circumstances 
these  detachments  should  be  prepared  to  meet  all  military  emergen- 
cies until  reenforcements  from  the  United  States  can  reasonably  be 
expected.  They  must,  therefore,  be  maintained  at  all  times  at  full 
statutory  strength,  and  must,  in  addition,  be  organized  with  the  view 
to  being  self-supporting,  preferably  during  the  continuance  of  war, 
or  at  least  until  the  Navy  has  accomplished  its  primary  mission  of 
securing  the  command  of  the  sea. 

The  force  at  home  is  on  an  entirely  different  basis.  It  may  or  may 
not  be  given  an  adequate  number  of  units  in  time  of  peace,  but  it  is 
supported  by  all  of  the  resources  of  the  Nation.  It  may  be  increased 
at  the  pleasure  of  Congress,  and  it  may  be  reenf orced  by  considerable 
forces  of  citizen  soldiery.  It  follows  from  these  considerations  that ' 
the  military  establishment  of  the  United  States  in  time  of  peace 
should  first  provide  effective  and  sufficient  garrisons  for  the  political 
and  strategic  outposts  of  the  United  States,  and  that  the  residue  at 
home  should  be  organized  with  the  view  to  ultimate  expansion  into 
such  war  forces  as  national  interests  may  require.  The  possibility 
of  a  satisfactory  mobilization  of  this  home  force  is  dependent  upon 
keeping  the  units  of  the  regular  contingent  at  full  statutory  strength. 

GENERAL  REQUIREMENTS  OF  OVERSEA   SERVICE. 

11.  The  Philippines. — A  decision  to  defend  the  Philippines  against 
a  foreign  enemy  is  a  matter  of  national  and  not  of  military  policy. 


8  A   PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

But  in  studying  the  military  requirements  of  such  defense  it  must  be 
remembered  that,  under  conditions  of  modern  warfare,  unless  our 
Navy  has  undisputed  control  of  the  sea,  we  can  not  reenforce  the 
peace  garrison  after  a  declaration  of  war  or  while  war  is  imminent. 

12.  Oahu. — The  maintenance  of  the  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbor, 
Oahu,  is  an  essential  factor  in  the  military  problem  of  holding  the 
Hawaiian  Islands.     These  islands  constitute  a  vital  element  in  the 
defense  of  the  Pacific  coast  and  in  securing  to  ourselves  the  full  value 
of  the  Panama  Canal  as  a  strategic  highway  between  the  two  oceans. 

The  problem  of  holding  the  Hawaiian  Islands  can  be  solved  by 
making  Oahu,  and  therefore  Pearl  Harbor,  secure  against  all  comers. 
A  satisfactory  solution  requires  the  joint  action  of  the  Army  and 
Navy.  Pearl  Harbor  and  Honolulu  are  already  protected  from 
direct  naval  attack  by  fortifications  now  nearing  completion.  These, 
while  deemed  adequate  to  meet  the  conditions  existing  when  they 
were  designed,  must  now  be  strengthened  to  meet  the  recent  increase 
in  power  of  guns  afloat;  but  no  matter  how  complete  these  harbor 
fortifications  on  the  southern  coast  of  Oahu  may  be,  they  are  unable 
to  prevent  attacks  either  on  the  remaining  hundred  miles  of  coast 
lying  beyond  the  range  of  their  guns  or  on  the  other  islands  of  the 
group.  Consequently  there  should  be  in  addition  a  force  of  modern 
submarines  and  destroyers  forming  part  of  the  permanent  naval 
equipment  of  Pearl  Harbor  with  sufficient  radius  of  action  to  keep 
the  Hawaiian  waters  thoroughly  patrolled  throughout  their  whole 
extent  and  to  make  them  dangerous  for  enemy  vessels.  Should  this 
force  be  worsted  in  combat  and  withdraAvn  before  the  arrival  of  our 
high-sea  fleet,  the  complete  control  of  the  local  waters  might  pass 
temporarily  to  the  enemy,  so  that  the  ultimate  security  of  both  Hono- 
lulu, the  naval  base  at  Pearl  Harbor,  and  indeed  of  the  whole  group, 
depends  upon  including  in  the  Oahu  garrison  enough  mobile  troops 
to  defeat  any  enemy  that  may  land  anywhere  on  the  island.  It  is 
clear  that  perfect  coordination  between  the  Army  and  Navy  at  this 
station  is  absolutely  essential  to  success  in  holding  this  key  to  the 
Pacific.  Unless  we  provide  such  dual  defense  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands 
we  can  not  be  sure  of  retaining  control  even  of  that  part  of  the  Pacific 
lying  within  the  sphere  of  defense  of  our  western  coast.  By  making 
such  provision  the  high-sea  fleet  is  left  free  to  seek  out  the  enemy  fleet 
in  Pacific  waters. 

13.  Panama. — The  Panama  Canal  is  a  very  important  strategic 
position  which  it  is  our  duty  to  hold.     By  our  control  of  this  highway 
between  the  two  oceans  the  effectiveness  of  our  fleet  and  our  general 
military  power  is  enormously  increased.     It  is  therefore  obvious  that 
the  unquestioned  security  of  the  canal  is  for  us  a  vital  military  need. 
The  permanent  garrison  should  be  strong  enough  to  guard  the  locks, 
spillways,  and  other  important  works  and  to  prevent  a  naval  attack 
which,  under  modern  conditions,  may  even  precede  a  declaration  of 
war.     We  should  therefore  be  able,  even  in  peace,  to  man  the  sea- 
coast  guns  and  mine  defense  that  cover  the  approach  to  the  canal, 
and  we  must  have  enough  mobile  troops  to  defeat  raids.     A  modern 
fleet  might  land  a  small  raiding  party  of  several  thousand  bluejackets 
at  any  one  or  more  of  a  number  of  places,  and  such  a  force  landing 
out  of  range  of  the  seacoast  guns  could,  if  unopposed,  penetrate  to 
some  vunerable  part  of  the  canal  within  a  few  hours.    The  permanent 
garrison  should  therefore  include  a  mobile  force  strong  enough  to 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  9 

anticipate  and  defeat  naval  raids  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  and 
to  protect  the  canal  against  more  serious  land  operations  liable  to  be 
undertaken  later.  If  the  enemy  is  operating  on  one  ocean  only,  it 
might  be  possible  to  send  reenf orcements  from  the  United  States,  but 
to  count  on  such  relief  would  be  running  too  great  chances.  By  au- 
thority of  the  Republic  of  Panama,  this  garrison  is  given  facilities 
in  time  of  peace  to  operate  beyond  the  Canal  Zone  in  order  that  the 
troops  may  be  properly  trained  for  their  special  mission  and  made 
familiar  with  the  terrain  over  which  they  may  be  called  upon  to 
operate  in  defending  the  canal. 

14.  Guantanamo. — The  policy  of  the  United  States  contemplates 
the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  at  Guantanamo.     Garrisons  of  coast 
artillery  and  mobile  troops  are  necessary  for  its  defense  and  should 
be  assigned  to  station  there  at  the  proper  time. 

15.  Alaska. — The  garrison  of  Alaska  should  be  large  enough  to 
support  the  authority  of  the  United  States,  and,  in  time  of  war,  to 
maintain  our  sovereignty  over  a  small  selected  area  of  the  Territory. 
As  work  on  the  Alaskan  Railroad  progresses,  the  military  needs  of 
Alaska  will  increase. 

16.  Porto  Rico  is  to  be  classified  with  the  Philipines  and  Guam. 
Unlike  Alaska  and  Hawaii,  these  island  possessions  have  not  been 
organized  as  Territories;  nevertheless,  they  all  belong  to  the  United 
States  and  must  be  protected. 

GENERAL    REQUIREMENTS    OF    HOME    SERVICE. 

IT.  General  distribution  of  Coast  Artillery  troops  in  fortified 
areas. — It  has  already  been  shown  where  we  should  have  garrisons 
for  oversea  service  and  why.  It  now  remains  to  show  how  we  should 
distribute  our  regular  troops  for  service  at  home.  Coast  Artillery 
stations  should  correspond  to  the  fortified  areas  on  the  seacoast,  and 
these  are  indicated  by  the  position  of  the  harbor  defenses,  which  are 
at  present  located  as  follows : 

Portland,  Me.  The  Potomac.  New  Orleans. 

Portsmouth,  N.  H.  Chesapeake  Bay.  Galveston. 

Boston.  Cape  Fear.  San  Diego. 

New  Bedford.  Charleston.  Los  Angeles. 

Narragansett  Bay.  Savannah.  San  Francisco. 

Long  Island  Sound.  Tampa.  Puget  Sound. 

New  York.  Key  West.  The  Columbia. 

The  Delaware.  Pensacola. 

Baltimore.  Mobile. 

18.  General  distribution  of  mobile  troops  in  strategic  areas. — As 
previously  explained,  the  influence  of  harbor  defenses  is  limited  to 
the  areas  within  the  range  of  their  guns.  To  provide  harbor  defenses 
without  mobile  forces  necessary  to  cover  the  unprotected  intervals  that 
lie  between  them  would  be  comparable  with  attempting  to  make  a 
house  burglar  proof  by  barring  the  doors  and  leaving  the  windows 
open.  There  is  not  a  case  in  history  where  seacoast  fortifications, 
efficiently  manned,  have  been  captured  by  direct  attack  from  the  sea. 
In  all  cases  of  capture  mobile  land  forces  have  been  employed  for  the 
purpose,  and  an  enemy  that  hopes  for  success  must  undertake  landing 
operations  against  us.  We  must  therefore  decide  upon  a  rational 
distribution  of  our  mobile  forces  to  meet  this  contingency. 


10          A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

19.  Puget  Sound  area, — Western  Washington  is  bordered  on  the 
east  by  the  steep  and  rugged  Cascade  Mountains,  on  the  south  by 
the  Columbia  River,  and  on  the  north  by  Juan  de  Fuca  Strait  and 
Canada.    This  corner  of  the  United  States  is  completely  cut  off  from 
the  rest  of  the  country  by  great  natural  obstacles  and  presents  an 
extensive  front  for  attack  by  sea.    While  the  maps  show  some  twenty 
passes  across  the  Cascade  Mountains,  communication  with  the  east 
is  almost  entirely  by  three  railroads,  all  crossing  at  points  less  than 
50  miles  apart  and  having  tunnels  or  other  vulnerable  structures. 
The  only  practicable  wagon  road  is  effectually  closed  to  traffic  for 
between  four  and  five  months  each  year  by  heavy  snows.    Communi- 
cation with  the  south  is  by  one  line  of  railroad,  crossing  the  Columbia 
River  by  bridge  at  Vancouver.     Communication  between  this  sec- 
tion and  the  east  and  south  is  thus  largely  dependent  upon  a  number 
of  structures  readily  destroyed  by  high  explosives,  and  impossible  of 
restoration  to  traffic  within  a  definite  time.    The  two  railroads  along 
the  Columbia  River,  at  the  point  where  it  breaks  through  the  moun- 
tains, could  be  easily  wrecked  so  as  to  -require  considerable  time  to 
repair,  and  the  gorge  could  be  held  by  a  small  force  against  a  large 
one  coming  from  the  east.    If  an  enemy  succeeds  in  entering  western 
Washington  and  in  seizing  and  destroying  the  important  bridges  and 
tunnels,  he  would  be  so  securely  established  as  to  render  it  extremely 
difficult  to  dislodge  him.    In  this  rich  region  an  invader  could  main- 
tain himself  indefinitely.     The  harbor  defenses  maintained  in  this 
region  are  reasonably  strong.    Ordinary  precaution  demands  that  a 
mobile  force  of  reasonable  strength  be  also  maintained  in  this  region. 

20.  California  area. — There  are  five  transcontinental  lines  of  rail- 
way entering  California.    The  Western  Pacific  and  Southern  Pacific 
by  the  passes  through  the   Sierras  northeast  of   Sacramento;   the 
Atchison,  Topeka  &  Santa  Fe,  and  the  San  Pedro,  Los  Angeles  & 
Salt  Lake  via  Daggetts  Pass  northeast  of  Los  Angeles;  and  the 
Southern  Pacific  via  the  Salton  Sea  and  Gorgonia  Pass  southeast  of 
Los  Angeles.     There  are  no  other  passes  through  the  Sierras  that 
have  been  considered  practicable.    There  is  no  railroad  running  south 
into  Lower  California.     Only  one  railroad,  the  Southern  Pacific, 
runs  north  into  Oregon.    As  in  the  Puget  Sound  region,  communica- 
tion with  the  east  is  largely  dependent  upon  structures  readily  de- 
stroyed by  explosives  and  impossible  of  restoration  to  traffic  within  a 
definite  time;  California  and  the  greater  centers  of  population  are 
separated  by  wide  expanses  of  sparsely  settled  country.    To  trans- 
port promptly  large  bodies  of  troops  into  California  would  be  difficult 
if  not  impossible  in  face  of  opposition  at  the  passes.    The  invader 
would  have  a  most  fertile  region  at  his  back,  while  the  reverse  would 
be  the  situation  with  us. 

The  harbor  defenses  maintained  in  this  region  are  reasonably 
strong,  but  they  are  of  little  use  unless  supported  by  a  reasonably 
strong  mobile  force  maintained  in  this  region. 

To  rely,  for  defense,  during  the  first  stages  of  a  war  upon  a  mobile 
force  shipped  in  from  the  east  is  to  invite  disaster. 

21.  Atlantic  area. — In  case  of  war  with  a  first-class  power  on  the 
Atlantic,  that  portion  of  our  country  lying  between  and  including 
Maine  and  Virginia  would  undoubtedly  be  the  primary  object  of  an 
invader.    While  all  other  points  along  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  11 

and  all  points  on  our  land  frontiers  would  undoubtedly  be  in  danger, 
the  danger  would  be  secondary  to  that  of  the  North  Atlantic  States 
above  named.  Here,  also,  the  harbor  defenses  are  reasonably  strong, 
and  here  also,  a  mobile  force  should  be  kept  sufficient  in  size  to  hold 
important  points  until  the  citizen  soldiery  can  be  mobilized. 

While  many  other  regions  are  important,  the  three  regions  de- 
scribed— Puget  Sound,  California,  and  the  North  Atlantic  States — 
contain  the  critical  areas. 

22.  Middle  West  area. — The  center  of  population  of  the  United 
States  is  in  the  middle  west,  and  here  should  be  located  a  mobile 
force  for  use  in  case  of  need,  on  either  the  Pacific  or  Atlantic  coast, 
the  northern  or  southern  border. 

NECESSARY   STRENGTH   OF   MOBILE  TROOPS  FOR  OVERSEA   SERVICE. 

23.  Constant  study  of  the  problem  which  confronts  each  of  our 
oversea  garrisons  in  connection  with  the  advance  made  in  arms,  trans- 
portation, tactics,  lines  of  information,  methods  of  communications, 
undersea  craft,  and  aerial  operations,  has  led  to  the  conclusions  that 
the  strength  of  the  oversea  garrisons,  herein  given  is  the  minimum 
below  which  they  should  not  be  allowed  to  fall  at  any  time. 

The  general  requirements  of  oversea  service  have  already  been 
stated  for  each  of  the  several  localities  concerned.  It  now  remains 
to  determine  the  necessary  strength  to  meet  these  requirements, 
taking  up  each  case  in  turn. 

24.  The  Philippines. — If  in  accordance  with  national  policy  it  is 
decided  to  keep  the  American  flag  flying  in  the  Philippines  in  war 
as  in  peace  it  becomes  essential  to  hold  Manila  Bay. 

25.  Oahu. — Having  in  mind  the  principles  governing  the  relations 
between  home  and  oversea  garrisons,  the  force  maintained  at  all 
times  in  Oahu  should  include : 

9  regiments  of  Infantry  (3  brigades). 

1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 

2  regiments  of  Field  Artillery. 

2  battalions  Engineers;  1  field  battalion  of  Signal  troops;  1  aero  squad- 
ron ;  1  telegraph  company. 
2  ambulance  companies. 
14  companies  Coast  Artillery. 

This  force  will  total  about  25,000  combatant  officers  and  men. 

26.  Panama. — The  force  maintained  at  all  times  in  the  Canal  Zone 
should  include : 

9  regiments  of  Infantry  (3  brigades). 
1  regiment  of  Cavalry. 

1  regiment  of  Field  Artillery. 

2  battalions  of  Engineers ;  1  field  battalion  Signal  troops ;  1  aero  squad- 

ron ;  1  telegraph  company. 
1  ambulance  company ;  1  evacuation  hospital. 
21  companies  Coast  Artillery  Corps. 

This  force  will  total  about  24,000  combatant  officers  and  men. 

27.  Guantanamo. — The  policy  of  the  United  States  contemplates 
the  establishment  of  a  naval  base  at  Guantanamo.     Garrisons  of 
Coast  Artillery  and  mobile  troops  are  necessary  for  its  defense  and 
should  be  assigned  to  station  there  at  the  proper  time. 


12 


A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


28.  Alaska. — The  garrison  of  Alaska  should  be  large  enough  to 
support  the  authority  of  the  United  States  and,  in  time  of  war,  to 
maintain  our  sovereignty  over  a  small  selected  area  of  the  Terri- 
tory.    As  work  on  the  Alaskan  Railroad  progresses  the  military 
needs  of  Alaska  will  increase. 

In  time  of  peace  it  is  believed  that  the  Alaskan  garrison  should  be 
one  regiment  of  Infantry  (1,915  officers  and  men),  to  be  increased 
later  as  circumstances  may  demand. 

29.  Porto  Rico. — The  present  garrison,  reorganized  into  a  full 
regiment  of  three  battalions,  etc.,  is  sufficient  (1,915  officers  and  men). 

30.  The  following  table  gives  a  summary  of  the  minimum  garrison 
to  be  maintained  on  over-sea  service : 

Table  of  garrisons  for  over-sea  stations. 


Localities. 

Regi- 
ments  of 
Infantry. 

Regi- 
ments of 
Cavalry. 

Batteries 
of  Field 
Artillery. 

Battal- 
ions of 
Engi- 
neers. 

Battal- 
ions, 
Signal 
Corps.1 

Aero 
squad- 
rons. 

Compa- 
nies of 
Coast 
Artillery 
Corps. 

Philippines 

9 

3 

18 

•11 

1£ 

j 

26 

Oahu 

9 

1 

12 

2 

!i 

1 

14 

Panama               .           

9 

1 

6 

2 

lj 

1 

21 

Alaska 

•| 

Porto  Rico 

31 

Total  

29 

5 

36 

5| 

4} 

3 

61 

1  Includes  1  telegraph  company  in  each  garrison. 
2 1  company  mounted  for  Cavalry  brigade. 
3  Native. 
Combatants— 

Mobile 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 


Officers  and  men. 

74,500 

7,500 


Total...  82,000 


NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  MOBILE  TROOPS  FOR  HOME  SERVICE. 

31.  Careful  studies  made  at  the  War  College,  extending  over  a 
period  of  years,  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  strength  of  the 
Infantry,  Cavalry,  Field  Artillery,  Engineers,  and  signal  troops  of 
the  Regular  Army  maintained  at  home  in  time  of  peace,  and  the  dis- 
tribution of  administrative  units  of  these  arms  in  the  principal 
strategic  areas,  should  be  as  given  in  the  following  table : 

Combatant  troops. 


Localities. 

Infantry 
regiment. 

Cavalry 
regiment. 

Field 
Artiller: 
regimen 

7 

Engi- 
neer 
bat- 
talions 

Bat- 
talions 
Signal 
Corps. 

Aero 
squad- 
rons. 

Puget  Sound  area                    

9 

3 

13 

2 

1  li 

1 

California 

9 

4 

3 

2 

U 

1 

North  Atlantic  States 

9 

4 

3 

2 

H 

1 

Middle  West 

9 

3 

3 

2 

li 

1 

Mexican  border  

6 

1 

1 

1 

Total 

36 

20 

15 

10 

7 

5 

1  Each  Cavalry  brigade  to  have  1  battalion  horse  artillery;  1  company  mounted  Engineers;  1  company 
Signal  Corps. 

Approximate  total,  121,000  officers  and  men. 


A   PROPER   MILITAEY    POLICY    FOE    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


13 


These  troops  should  be  organized  in  higher  tactical  units  and  dis- 
tributed in  strategic  areas  substantially  as  follows : 

Puget  Sound  area One  division  (less  divisional  Cavalry)  and  one  Cavalry 

brigade  (of  3  regiments) . 

California One  division  and  one  Cavalry  brigade. 

North  Atlantic  States— One  division  and  one  Cavalry  brigade. 

Middle  West One  division  (less  divisional  Cavalry)  and  one  Cavalry 

brigade. 
Mexican  border — 

West  of  El  Paso One  Cavalry  brigade. 

East  of  El  Paso One  Cavalry  brigade. 

NECESSARY  STRENGTH  OF  COAST  ARTILLERY  TROOPS  REQUIRED  FOR  SERVICE 
OVERSEAS  AND  AT  HOME. 

32.  The  strength  of  the  Coast  Artillery  depends  upon  the  number 
of  guns  and  mine  fields  installed  and  projected  and  upon  the  assist- 
ance to  be  received  from  Organized  Militia  units.  An  estimate  pre- 
pared in  the  Office  of  the  Chief  of  Coast  Artillery 1  gives  the  follow- 
ing strength,  in  companies,  required  under  the  supposition  that  all 
mine  fields  and  all  oversea  guns  and  one-half  the  guns  at  home  are 
manned  from  the  Regular  Army : 

Companies, 

Philippines 26 

Oahu 14 

Panama 21 

United  States-  228 


Total 

Total  companies  (gun  and  mine) 


289 
289 


Officers  and  men 34,413 

TOTAL    STRENGTH  OF  THE   REGULAR   TROOPS  REQUIRED   FOR  ALL   SERVICES. 


33.  Combining  all  previous  estimates  of  Coast  Artillery  and  mobile 
troops  required  for  service  in  oversea  garrisons  and  at  home,  the  fol- 
lowing tabular  statement  of  the  required  strength  of  the  Regular 
Army  in  units  appropriate  to  each  arm,  results,  viz : 


» 

Localities. 

Infantry 
regi- 
ments. 

Cavalry 
regi- 
ments. 

Field 
Artillery 
regi- 
ments. 

Coast 
Artillery 
com- 
panies. 

Engi- 
neer 
bat- 
talions. 

Signal  Corps, 

Battal- 
ions. 

Aero 
squads. 

Philippines  2 

9 
9 
9 
1 
1 
9 
9 
9 
9 

3 
1 

1 

3 
2 
1 

26 
14 
21 

? 

2 

li 
l| 

1* 

1 
1 
1 

Oahu  

Canal  Zone 

Alaska  

Porto  Rico  

Puget  Sound  area    

3 
4 
4 
3 
6 

1 

1 

li 
l| 
If 

P 

1 
1 
1 
1 
1 

California 

North  Atlantic  States     .  . 

Middle  West 

Mexican  border.. 

United  States 

228 

Total  required 

65 

25 

21 

289 

15J 

Hi 

8 

1  This  estimate  can  only  be  verified  by  an  inspection  of  all  the  harbors  in  question,  for  which  inspection 
there  has  not  been  sufficient  time  since  this  estimate  was  received. 

3  Nine  regiments  Infantry,  2  regiments  Field  Artillery,  2  battalions  Engineers.  Filipinos  to  be  added, 
21,000  officers  and  men. 


14          A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

These  figures  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

Oversea : 

Mobile  (combatant) 74,  500 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 7,  500 

82,000 
In  United  States: 

Mobile  (combatant) 121,000 

Coast  Artillery  Corps 27,  000 

-  148,  000 
Total : 

Mobile  (combatant) 195,  500 

Coast  Artillery  Corps__l 34,  500 

230,  000 

To  this  total  should  be  added  officers  and  men  for  the  Sanitary, 
Quartermaster,  Ordnance  Department,  etc.,  appropriate  to  a  force  of 
this  strength,  amounting  approximately  to  30,000  officers  and  men. 
Including  Philippine  Scouts,  21,000,  the  grand  total  becomes  281,000. 

34.  Organization. — The  Tables  of  Organization,  approved  and 
published  on  February  25.  1914,  for  the  information  and  government 
of  the  Regular  Army  and  Organized  Militia  of  the  United  States 
have  been  taken  as  the  guide  in  estimating  the  numerical  strength  of 
the  personnel  of  the  various  tactical  and  administrative  units  men- 
tioned in  this  report.  This  was  done  as  a  matter  of  convenience  and 
because  the  service  generally  is  familiar  with  these  tables,  which  are 
the  latest  official  publication  of  the  War  Department  on  this  subject. 
They  conform  to  the  Field  Service  Regulations  and  are  the  best  that 
can  be  devised  under  the  limitation  of  the  present  laws  governing  the 
Army,  but  it  can  not  be  too  emphatically  stated  that  they  are  for 
emergency  use  only  and  contain  certain  undesirable  and  unscientific 
features  which  should  be  corrected  as  soon  as  the  necessary  legisla- 
tion can  be  obtained.  For  example,  the  war  organization  shown  in 
the  tables  is  provisional  only,  while  the  peace  strength  is  arranged 
so  as  not  to  exceed  the  total  enlisted  strength  of  about  93,000  men 
now  permitted  by  existing  appropriations. 

This  limitation  falls  heaviest  upon  the  Infantry,  whose  organiza- 
tions on  home  service  are  maintained  at  only  43  per  cent  of  full  statu- 
tory strength,  while  the  Cavalry  organizations  are  maintained  at  75 
per  cent  and  those  of  Field  Artillery  at  77  per  cent  of  such  strength. 
It  is  generally  conceded  that  our  Infantry  companies  should  each 
have  the  full  statutory  strength  of  150  men  in  order  to  permit  proper 
training  of  the  officers  in  time  of  peace  and  supply  efficient  fighting 
strength  in  time  of  war. 

In  consequence  of  the  greatly  reduced  strength  of  these  Infantry 
organizations,  their  efficiency  is  unduly  decreased  and  overhead 
charges  correspondingly  increased. 

The  requirements  of  modern  war  demand  that  a  machine-gun  unit, 
a  supply  unit,  and  certain  mounted  men  be  attached  to  each  regiment, 
and  that  units  of  various  strengths  be  assigned  to  brigade  and  divi- 
sion headquarters.  None  of  these  units  is  authorized  by  law,  vet  all 
are  essential.  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  represent  an  effort  to 
adapt  an  archaic  statutory  organization  to  modern  requirements  by 
organizing  the  necessary 'additional  units,  provisionally.  This  has 
been  done  by  detaching  from  statutory  organizations  the  personnel 
required.  An  examination  of  the  tables  will  show  that  more  than 
5  per  cent  of  the  Infantry  personnel  authorized  by  Congress  have 


A   PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  15 

been  diverted  from  their  legitimate  duty  as  members  of  statutory 
organizations  and  have  been  assigned  to  provisional  units  which, 
while  necessary  and  essential,  have  only  the  sanction  of  departmental 
authority,  and  lack  the  efficiency  which  can  only  be  given  by  statute. 
In  the  Cavalry  more  than  9  per  cent  are  similarly  diverted. 

Kecognizing  these  facts,  the  War  College  Division  of  the  General 
Staff  has  prepared  a  plan  for  organizing  on  modern  lines  an  army 
of  the  strength  just  shown  to  be  necessary  for  the  national  needs. 
Should  this  plan  be  approved,  the  organization  of  the  Regular 
Army,  the  militia,  and  whatever  reserves  are  formed  would  proceed 
along  the  new  lines. 

II.    THE   ORGANIZED   MILITIA. 

35.  The  act  of  Congress  approved  April  25,  1914,  commonly  known 
as  the  volunteer  law,  defines  the  land  forces  of  the  United  States  as 
"  the  Regular  Army,  the  organized  land  militia  while  in  the  service 
of  the  United  States,  and  such  volunteer  forces  as  Congress  may 
authorize." 

The  Organized  Militia,  in  addition  to  its  use  as  a  State  force,  is 
available  for  use  by  the  Federal  Government,  as  provided  in  the 
Constitution. 

36.  Constitutional  functions  of  the  Organized  Militia. — Its  consti- 
tutional functions  are  the  following: 

(a)  A  State  force  to  preserve  order  within  the  State  limits,  in 
order  to  avoid  calling  upon  the  Regular  Army  or  the  Organized 
Militia  of  other  States  to  discharge  such  function. 

(b)  A  Federal  force  when  called  forth  by  the  President,  and  duly 
mustered  as  prescribed  by  Congress,  for  any  of  the  three  purposes 
authorized  by  the  Constitution. 

37.  Some  uses  of  the  Organized  Militia  as  a  Federal  force. — Hav- 
ing been  called  forth  as  militia,  they  may  be  used  as  follows: 

(a)  As  Coast  Artillery  supports  and  reserves. 

(b)  To  guard  and  protect  certain  bridges,  canal  locks,  arsenals, 
depots  of  supplies,  docks,  navy  yards,  and  other  vulnerable  points  in 
the  home  territory. 

(c)  To  guard  lines  of  communication  within  the  limits  of  the 
United  States. 

38.  Limitations. — It  is  stated  later  in  this  report  that  12  months 
at  150  hours  per  month,  "  is  considered  the  minimum  length  of  time 
of  actual  training  considered  necessary  to  prepare  troops  for  war 
service."     Due  to  constitutional  limitations,  Congress  has  not  the 
power  to  fix  and  require  such  an  amount  of  training  for  the  Organ- 
ized Militia.    No  force  can  be  considered  a  portion  of  our  first  line 
whose  control  and  training  is  so  little  subject  to  Federal  authority 
in  peace.    No  force  should  be  considered  a  portion  of  our  first  line  in 
war  unless  it  be  maintained  fully  organized  and  equipped  in  peace  at 
practically  war  strength.    This  would  exclude  the  Organized  Militia 
from  consideration  for  service  in  the  first  line  mainly  because  of  the 
impossibility  of  giving  it  in  peace  the  training  required  for  such 
function.     It  may  be  necessary  to  continue  Federal  support  of  the 
Organized  Militia  in  order  that  some  organized  force  may  be  imme- 
diately available  for  the  purposes  set  forth  in  paragraphs  36  and  37, 


16          A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY   FOR   THE    UNITED    STATES. 

39.  Recommendations. — In  the  preparation  of  plans  for  the  na- 
tional defense  and  for  the  preservation  of  the  honor  and  dignity  of 
the  United  States,  the  number  of  troops  that  are  deemed  necessary  are 
largely  in  excess  of  the  total  Eegular  and  Militia  forces  available  in 
the  United  States. 

It  is  only  during  the  existence  of  war,  or  when  war  is  imminent, 
that  any  other  forces  may  be  raised  under  existing  law.  When  Con- 
gress so  authorizes  the  President,  he  may  call  forth  volunteers. 

Section  3  of  the  volunteer  law  provides  that  under  certain  con- 
ditions organizations  of  the  Organized  Militia  may  be  received  into 
the  Volunteer  Service  in  advance  of  any  other  organizations  of  the 
same  arm  or  class  from  the  same  State,  Territory,  or  District;  and 
section  4  of  the  act  of  May  27,  1908,  amending  the  militia  law,  pro- 
vides that  the  Militia  shall  be  called  into  the  service  in  advance  of  any 
volunteer  force  that  may  be  raised. 

It  is  evident  that  it  can  not  be  known  prior  to  the  existence  of  the 
imminence  of  war  what  organizations,  if  any,  of  the  Organized 
Militia  will  enter  the  volunteer  service,  and  that  no  definite  plans  can 
be  prepared  providing  for  the  use  of  such  organizations,  either  as 
militia  or  as  volunteers,  until  war  is  actually  upon  us. 

No  legislation  affecting  the  Organized  Militia  is  recommended 
beyond  the  repeal  of  all  provisions  of  laws  now  in  effect  whereby 
militia  or  militia  organizations  may  or  must  be  received  into  the 
Federal  service  in  advance  of  any  other  forces. 

This  recommendation  is  not  to  be  construed  as  advocating  express 
repeal  of  certain  sections  of  existing  laws  relating  to  the  Organized 
Militia,  but  as  suggesting  that  any  legislation  hereafter  proposed 
for  the  organization  of  a  Federal  reserve  force  shall  contain  the 
usual  concluding  section  repealing  all  laws  and  parts  of  laws  incon- 
sistent therewith,  and  that  such  legislation  be  so  framed  as  to  render 
inconsistent  with  it  the  provisions  of  law  just  referred  to. 

III.   RESERVES. 

40.  Reserves  include:  (a)  Well-instructed  soldiers  of  the  Regular 
Army  furloughed  to  what  is  herein  termed  the  regular  reserve,  (b) 
citizen  soldiers,  (c)  reserve  officers. 

41.  The  regular  reserve.— As  the  United   States  should  have  a 
mobile  force  of  500,000  soldiers  available  at  home  at  the  outbreak  of 
war,  the  Army,  with  the  regular  reserve,  should  amount  to  this 
strength.     In  order  to  develop  the  necessary  regular  reserve  with  the 
Army  at  the  strength  advocated  in  this  policy,  enlistments  would 
trave  to  be  for  about  eight  years — two  with  the  colors  and  six  in 
reserve.    That  would,  in  eight  years,  result  in  approximately  the 
following  mobile  forces  at  home  available  at  the  outbreak  of  war: 

(1)  Mobile  regular  troops  (combatant)  with  the  colors 121,000 

(2)  The  regular  reserve 379,000 


Total _  500,000 

During  the  first  weeks  of  war  in  this  country  the  military  situation 
will  probably  be  critical.  At  that  time  every  fully  trained  soldier 
should  be  put  in  the  field.  To  do  that  with  the  small  military  estab- 
lishment herein  advocated  it  is  necessary  that  during  peace  the  Army 


A   PROPER    MIL1TARI    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES.  17 

be  kept  at  war  strength,  and  that  the  regular  reserve  be  organized 
and  not  kept  back  to  replace  losses  expected  during  war.  Such  losses 
should  be  replaced  from  depot  units. 

42.  Citizen  soldiers. — In   addition   to   the   500,000   fully   trained 
mobile  troops  mentioned  above,  at  least  500,000  more — a  total  of 
1,000,000  men — should  be  prepared  to  take  the  field  immediately  on 
the  outbreak  of  war  and  should  have  had  sufficient  previous  military 
training  to  enable  them  to  meet  a  trained  enemy  within  three  months. 
Twelve  months'  intensive  training  is  the  minimum  that  will  prepare 
troops  for  war  service.     Therefore  the  500,000  partly  trained  troops 
above  referred  to  require  nine  months'  military  training  before  war 
begins.     Military  efficiency  of  reserves  requires  that  Regular  Army 
officers  be  assigned  thereto  for  training  purposes — at  least  one  to 
every  400  men — and  that  organizations  and  specially  designated  non- 
commissioned officers  of  the  Army  be  utilized  in  instructing  reserves 
as  far  as  practicable. 

Based  upon  experience  with  Tables  of  Organization,  1914,  the 
War  College  Division  has  recently  prepared  a  new  plan  of  organiza- 
tion for  the  Army.  The  Regular  Army  and  the  reserves  should  be 
organized  according  to  this  plan.  Organizations  should  be  formed 
of  men  from  the  districts  to  which  their  respective  organizations  are 
assigned  for  recruiting.  For  this  purpose,  each  organization  should 
be  assigned  to  a  district  from  which  recruits  most  suitable  for  the 
service  required  of  the  organization  may  be  obtained — mounted  units 
to  horse-raising  districts,  technical  troops  to  manufacturing  districts, 
etc.  As  a  rule  the  size  of  districts  should  be  about  in  proportion  to 
population  of  the  qualifications — age,  etc. — required.  Organizations 
in  war  should  be  kept  at  full  strength  from  the  depot  units  which 
they  should  have  in  their  respective  recruiting  districts. 

43.  Reserve  officers. — Officers  for  staff  and  organizations  of  re- 
serves, and  officers  for  temporary  appointment  in  the  Regular  Army 
as  provided  for  in  section  8  of  the  volunteer  law  (act  of  Congress 
approved  Apr.  25,  1914),  should  be  selected  and  trained  in  time  of 
peace.     The  President  should  be  authorized  to  issue,  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate,  commissions  as  reserve  officers 
to  citizens  of  the  United  States  who,  upon  examination  prescribed  by 
the  Secretary  of  War,  demonstrate  their  physical,  mental,  moral, 
and  professional  fitness  therefor,  and  who  duly  obligate  themselves 
to  render  military  service  to  the  United  States  while  their  commis- 
sions are  valid.     Such  commissions  should  be  valid  five  years,  and 
renewable  under  such  regulations  regarding  examinations  and  quali- 
fications as  the  Secretary  of  War  may  from  time  to  time  prescribe. 

IV.    VOLUNTEERS. 

44.  In  addition  to  any  forces  that  may  be  maintained  and  trained 
in  time  of  peace,  provision  must  be  made  for  vastly  increasing  such 
forces  in  time  of  war.    These  must  come  from  the  untrained  body  of 
citizens  and  provisions  for  raising  them  is  contained  in  the  act  of 
Congress  approved  April  25,  1914. 

45.  This  act  meets  the  military  needs  for  raising  volunteer  troops 
as  far  as  concerns  the  enlisted  personnel,  except  in  two  particulars, 
which  are :  First,  that  under  the  existing  laws  certain  organizations 


18  A    PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY    FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 

of  the  militia,  with  numbers  far  below  the  full  strength,  can  enter  the 
volunteer  force  in  advance  of  other  similar  volunteer  organizations 
from  the  same  State ;  and  second,  no  volunteers  of  any  arm  or  branch 
can  be  raised  until  all  the  militia  of  that  particular  arm  or  branch 
have  been  called  into  the  service  of  the  United  States.  The  changes 
necessary  to  remedy  these  defects  have  been  set  forth  in  paragraph  39 
under  the  subject  of  the  Organized  Militia. 

V.    RESERVE  MATERIEL. 

46.  Of  all  the  features  disclosed  by  the  war  in  Europe  none  stands 
more  clearly  revealed  than  the  power  to  be  derived  from  national 
economic  organization  behind  the  armed  forces  of  a  nation. 

47.  In  a  war  of  gigantic  proportions  the  chances  of  success  are 
immeasurably  lessened    by  wastage,  abuse,  and    confusion.     Steps 
should  be  taken  looking  toward  a  national  organization  of  our  eco- 
nomic and  industrial  resources  as  well  as  our  resources  in  fighting 
men. 

48.  In  its  report  the  commission  appointed  by  the  President  to 
investigate  the  conduct  of  the  War  Department  in  the  War  with 
Spain  used  the  following  language : 

One  of  the  lessons  taught  by  the  war  is  that  the  country  should  hereafter  be 
in  a  better  state  of  preparation  for  war.  Testimony  has  been  taken  on  this  sub- 
ject and  suggestions  have  been  made  that  large  supplies  of  all  the  materiel  not 
liable  to  deterioration  should  be  kept  on  hand,  to  be  continuously  issued  and 
renewed,  so  that  in  any  emergency  they  might  be  available.  Especially  should 
this  be  the  case  \vith  such  supplies,  equipment,  and  ordnance  stores  as  are  not 
in  general  use  in  the  United  States  and  which  can  not  be  rapidly  obtained  in 
open  market. 

49.  The  lack  of  such  articles  as  shoes,  wagons,  harness,  rifles, 
saddles,  medical  chests,  and  so  on,  will  render  ineffective  an  army 
just  as  certainly  as  will  the  lack  of  ammunition. 

50.  For  the  purposes  of  storage  military  supplies  may  be  divided 
into  four  classes : 

(a)  Supplies  that  can  be  obtained  in  great  quantities  in  the  open 
market  at  any  time. 

(b)  Those  that  can  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  15  days' 
notice. 

((?)  Those  that  can  be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice. 
(d)  Those  that  can  not  be  obtained  within  three  months. 

51.  The  War  College  Division  of  the  General  Staff  is  of  the  opin- 
ion that  for  purposes  of  defense  we  should  maintain  the  troops  enu- 
merated in  Parts  I  and  III  of  this  report. 

52.  A  fully  trained  force,  to  be  effective  during  the  critical  period 
when  war  is  imminent  and  during  the  first  few  weeks  of  a  war,  must 
not  be  hampered  by  lack  of  necessary  supplies  and  equipment.    For 
this  reason,  supplies  of  all  kinds  which  can  not  be  obtained  in  the 
open  market  at  any  time  must  be  kept  on  hand,  in  use  and  in  store, 
at  home  and  oversea,  sufficient  to  equip  without  delay  all  troops  whose 
training  warrants  sending  them  promptly  into  the  field. 

53.  It  is  probable  that  as  soon  as  war  becomes  imminent,  the  Conti- 
nental Army — 500,000  mobile  troops — will  also  be  called  out.     As 
this  partially  trained  force  can  not  be  expected  to  take  the  field  within 
three  months'  time,  it  is  practicable  to  refrain,  after  the  third  year, 
from  keeping  on  hand  or  'n  store  for  it  any  articles  of  equipment 


A   PROPER    MILITARY    POLICY   FOR    THE    UNITED    STATES. 


19 


except  those  necessary  to  complete  its  training  and  those  which  can 
not  be  procured  within  three  months. 

54.  The  total  number  of  harbor  defense  troops  necessary  is  about 
50.000.    Due  to  conditions  of  service,  it  is  believed  that  ultimately 
supplies  of  all  kinds  for  60,000  should  be  kept  on  hand. 

55.  In  any  great  war,  volunteers  must  be  called  out  in  addition  to 
the  troops  above  enumerated. 

56.  It  would  be  unwise  to  have  on  hand  at  the  beginning  of  a  war 
merely  the  supplies  sufficient  to  place  in  the  field  our  first  contingent 
of  troops  and  to  complete  the  training  of  the  Continental  Army,  and 
to  be  unprepared  to  supply  to  even  a  limited  extent  the  Volunteer 
Army  we  should  have  to  raise,  not  to  mention  replacements  of  arms, 
ammunition,  clothing  and  equipment  of  all  kinds  for  those  already 
in  the  field ;  but  on  account  of  the  great  sum  of  money  which  will  be 
necessary  in  entering  upon  a  program  for  collecting  and  storing  mili- 
tary supplies  it  is  believed  that  the  subject  of  equipment  for  a  Volun- 
teer Army  and  replacements  for  the  Regular  and  Continental  Armies 
should  be  provided  for  by  obtaining  options  with  domestic  manufac- 
turers to  furnish  the  required  supplies,  all  of  domestic  manufacture, 
in  accordance  with  tentative  contracts  to  be  made  by  the  supply  de- 
partments with  such  manufacturers  in  time  of  peace.    By  so  doing  we 
will  be  taking  the  initial  steps  toward  organizing  the  industrial  and 
economic  resources  of  the  country  as  well  as  its  resources  in  fighting 
men. 

."»7.  Referring  to  Part  III,  approximately  the  following  troops  will 
be  available  at  the  close  of  the  successive  years : 


Fully- 
trained 
mobile 
troops. 

Partially- 
trained 
Conti- 
nental 
Army. 

Harbor- 
defense 
troops. 

Total. 

First  year 

160  000 

185  000 

30  000 

375  000 

Second  year      

219.000 

351  000 

40'000 

610,000 

Third  year 

320  000 

500  000 

50  000 

870  000 

Fourth  year    

383,000 

500  000 

52  000 

935  000 

Fifth  year 

439  000 

500  000 

54  000 

993  000 

Sixth  year  .  .                ... 

489.000 

500  000 

56  000 

1  045  000 

Seventh  year  ,  

534.000 

500,000 

58,000 

1,092,000 

E  ighth  year  

574,000 

500  000 

60  000 

1  134  000 

A  study  of  these  figures  and  of  the  difficulties  we  have  experienced 
in  the  past  in  the  matter  of  supplies  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
program  adopted  for  procuring  reserve  supplies  should  be  such  that 
at  the  close  of  each  year  we  should  have  in  use  and  in  store,  at  home 
and  oversea,  supplies  of  all  kinds  necessary  to  equip : 


Infantry 
divisions. 

Cavalry 
divisions 
of  9  regi- 
ments. 

Harbor- 
defense 
troops. 

First  year 

13 

3 

30  000 

Second  year  

22 

5 

40'000 

Third  year 

32 

g 

50  000 

Fourth  year 

34 

52  000 

Fifth  year  

36 

g 

54  000 

Sixth  year  

37 

9 

56.000 

Seventh  year  

38 

10 

58  000 

Eighth  year 

40 

10 

60  000 

20          A   PROPER   MILITARY   POLICY   FOR   THE    UNITED   STATES. 


The  supplies  acquired  during  the  first  three  years  should  include 
all  articles  which  can  not  be  obtained  in  sufficient  quantities  on  15 
days'  notice,  those  acquired  during  the  last  five  years  to  include  only 
those  articles  which  can  not  be  obtained  on  three  months'  notice. 
After  the  eighth  year  the  program  should  be  extended  to  provide  for 
the  storing  of  such  additional  machine  guns,  rifles,  field  guns,  ammu- 
nition, etc.,  as  may  be  considered  advisable. 

58.  In  order  that  vast  supplies  pertaining  to  one  supply  bureau 
should  not  be  secured  and  relatively  nothing  be  done  by  other  supply 
bureaus,  supplies  should  be  obtained  progressively  in  complete  divi- 
sion units. 

59.  In  order  that  the  efforts  of  the  various  supply  bureaus  may  be 
properly  coordinated  by  the  Chief  of  Staff,  reserve  supplies  should 
be  collected  in  general  supply  depots  located  in  accordance  with  the 
general  principle  below  enumerated.     Each  general  supply  depot 
should  be  considered  a  place  of  issue  in  time  of  peace  for  all  articles 
of  field  equipment,  so  that  the  stock  on  hand  will  be  continually 
turned  over  and  the  machinery  for  the  issuing  and  forwarding  of 
supplies  will  be  in  operation  at  the  outbreak  of  war.     The  com- 
mander of  each  general  supply  depot  should  be  either  a  line  or  a 
staff  officer  specially  selected  by  and  reporting  direct  to  the  Chief 
of  Staff  or  to  the  department  commander  and  independent  of  the 
control  of  any  one  particular  staff  department  but  keeping  in  touch 
with  all.    The  commander  of  each  general  supply  depot  should  be 
assisted  by  the  necessary  commissioned,  enlisted,  and  civilian  person- 
nel.   Supplies  for  not  more  than  three  division  units  should  be  stored 
at  any  one  locality.     Each  place  selected  for  a  reserve  storehouse 
should  be  one  that  will  be  at  all  times  under  adequate  military  pro- 
tection, .  where  ground   is  available   and   where   abundant   railroad 
facilities  exist. 

60.  As  a  general  military  principle,  no  supply  depot,  arsenal,  nor 
manufacturing  plant  of  any  considerable  size,  supported  by  War 
Department  appropriations  for  military  purposes,  should  be  estab- 
lished or  maintained  east  of  the  Appalachian  Mountains,  west  of  the. 
Cascade  or  Sierra  Nevada  Mountains,  nor  within  200  miles  of  our 
Canadian  or  Mexican  borders,  and  steps  should  be  taken  gradually 
to  cause  to  be  moved  depots  and  manufacturing  plants  already  estab- 
lished in  violation  of  this  military  principle. 

61.  The  estimated  cost  of  the  field  equipment  of  one  Infantry  divi- 
sion, Tables  of  Organization  1914,  is  as  follows : 


Kind  of  supplies. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained in  the 
open  market 
in  great 
quantities  at 
any  time. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained on  15 
days'  notice. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained on 
3  months' 
notice. 

Can  not  be 
obtained  on 
3  months' 
notice. 

Signal  supplies 

$722.  12 
51,983.35 
1,835.26 
5,779.67 
10,997.95 

$1,688.51 
54,054.45 
471.  59 
7,  730.  96 
10,189.63 

$6,030.46 
3,177,083.47 
7,  703.  97 
257,  489.  89 
88,  861.  51 

$385,310.26 

Quartermaster  supplies 

Engineer  supplies 

8,  428.  95 
4,  164,  770.  6S 

Ordnance  supplies  

Medical  supplies 

A  PROPER   MILITARY   POLICY   FOR   THE    UNITED   STATES. 


21 


And  the  estimated  cost  of  the  field  equipment  of  one  Cavalry 
division  of  nine  regiments  is  approximately  as  follows : 


Kind  of  supplies. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained in  the 
open  market 
in  great 
quantities  at 
any  time. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained on  15 
days'  notice. 

Can  be  ob- 
tained on 
3  months' 
notice. 

Can  not  be 
obtained  on 
3  months' 
notice. 

Signal  supplies                                      ... 

$370.80 

$1  638.  53 

$4  290  61 

$277  156  43 

Quartermaster  supplies 

55  102  48 

76  143  40 

4  584  628  93 

Engineer  supplies                 .            ......... 

1,  769.  59 

416.  53 

10  885  20 

3  999  45 

Ordnance  supplies 

31  862  02 

18  630  56 

311  056  68 

3  541  004  68 

Medical  supplies  

13,  454.  99 

13,  060.  57 

108  630.  36 

62.  While  the  amount  of  money  involved  is  large,  practically  all  of 
it  will  remain  at  home,  especially  if  every  effort  be  made  by  the  sup- 
ply bureaus  to  eliminate  from  supply  tables  all  articles  not  of  domes- 
tic manufacture.  It  must  also  be  kept  in  mind  that  it  is  cheaper  to 
buy  war  supplies  in  time  of  peace  than  in  time  of  war. 


List  of  Brochures  Prepared  by  the  War  College  Division,  General  Staff  Corps,  as 
Supplements  to  the  Statement  of  a  Proper  Military  Policy  for  the  United 

States. 

NOVEMBER,  1915. 
Doc. 

No. 

506.  Changes  iu  organization  found  necessary  during  progress  of  the  European 

War.    WCD  4886-23. 

507.  Comparison  of  cost  of  our  military  establishment  with   those  of  other 

countries.     WCD  9053-120. 

508.  Coordination  of  the  mobile  and  coast  artillery  units  of  the  army  in  the 

national  defense.     WCD  8911-9. 

509.  Development  of  large  caliber  mobile  artillery  and  machine  guns  in  the 

present  European  War.     WCD  9239-1. 

510.  Educational  institutions  giving  military  training  as  a  source  for  a  supply 

of  reserve  officers  for  a  national  army.     WCD  9053-121. 

511.  Elimination   of   unnecessary   expense   from   army    administration.     WCD 

9053-113. 
-  512.  Finances  and  costs  of  the  present  European  War.     WCD  9287-1. 

513.  Fortifications.     WCD  4896-4. 

514.  General  Staffs  of  certain  belligerent  powers.     WCD  9286-2. 

515.  Military  aviation.     WCD  9311-1. 

516.  Militia  as  organized  under  the  Constitution  and  its  value  to  the  Nation 

as  a  military  asset.     WCD  7835-9. 

517.  Mobilization  of  industries  and  utilization  of  the  commercial  and  industrial 

resources  of  the  country  for  war  purposes  in  emergency.     WCD  8121-45. 

518.  Modern  organization  for  the  Regular  Army  and  its  use  as  a  model  in 

organizing  other  forces.    WCD  9302-1. 

519.  Motor  transport  in  campaign.    WCD  9318-1. 

520.  Organization  and  administration  of  the  War  Department  adapted  to  a 

change  from  peace  conditions  to  a  state  of  war.    WCD  9262-14. 

521.  1.  Organization,  training,  and  mobilization  of  a  force  of  citizen  soldiery. 

2.  Method  of  training  a  citizen  army  on  the  outbreak  of  war  to  insure 
its  preparedness  for  field  service.    WCD  7541-12. 

522.  Organization,   training,   and   mobilization   of   a   reserve   for   the   Regular 

Army.    WCD  8106-15. 

523.  Organization,  training,  and  mobilization  of  volunteers  under  the  act  of 

April  25,  1914.    WCD  8160-25. 

524.  Outline   of  plan   for   military    training   in   public   schools   of  the   United 

States.    WCD  9064-16. 

525.  Pension  roll  as  affected  by  the  war  with  Spain  in  1898.    WCD  9290-3. 

526.  Personnel  versus  materiel  in  plans  for  national  defense.    WCD  9314-1. 

527.  Places  of  origin  and  ability  to  procure  supplies  needed  in  vast  quantities 

in  time  of  war.    WCD  8121-39. 

528.  Proper  relationship  between  the  army  and  the  press  in  war.    WCD  8976-6. 

529.  Recruitment  of  officers  in  time  of  peace  in  the  principal  armies  of  Europe. 

WCD  9278-1. 

530.  Standardization  of  methods  of  military  instruction  at  schools  and  colleges 

in  the  United  States,  with  draft  of  a  bill  to  establish  a  Reserve  Officers' 
Training  Corps.    WCD  9089-8. 

531.  Statistical  comparison  of  universal  and  voluntary  service.    WCD  4886-25. 

532.  Strategic  location  of  military  depots,  arsenals,  and  manufacturing  plants 

in  the  United  States.     WCD  8121-42. 

533.  Sanitary  troops  in  foreign  armies.    WCD  9319-1. 

534.  Training  of  forces  of  belligerent  nations  of  Europe.    WCD  9289-1. 

535.  Utilization  of  our  resources  in  various  means  of  transportation  and  of 

the  services  of  trained  specialists.    WCD  9053-111. 

22 

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